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Abstract 
 
The aim of this study is to explore more fully the relationship between total 
quality management (TQM) and firm performance, taking TQM as an internally 
consistent system of practices. The paper tests the link between the two variables using 
the universal approach, analyzes whether the most competitive firms are those adopting 
TQM, and tests for an isomorphic effect on other firms.  The study uses a sample of 
Spanish firms that have received TQM prizes at the national or regional level between 
1997 and 2003 and a control sample for comparison.  The findings indicate that in the 
absence of any evidence to confirm the universal hypothesis, TQM pioneers experience 
performance gains, because of the early implementation of the system; however, late 
adopters do not experience similar results.  Firms using a TQM system are not 
necessarily better than their counterparts are, before putting the system into action.  One 
important aspect of the contribution of this study is of a methodological nature, since it 
uses panel data, which takes into account the unobservable heterogeneity between 
individuals and the dynamics of firms’ financial variables.  
 
Keywords: Total quality management, performance, institutional theory, 
systemic approach  
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1. Introduction 
Though many researchers consider Total quality management (TQM) to be an 
important organizational innovation, often authors include TQM among management 
fads (David and Strang, 2006; Miller, Hartwick and Le Breton-Miller, 2004; Rich, 
2008). A great deal of empirical research investigates the relationship between TQM 
and performance. Some authors find positive results (Anderson, Rungtusanatham and 
Schroeder, 1995; Choi and Eboch, 1998; Hendricks and Singhal, 1996, 1997, 2001a, b; 
Shenaway, Baker and Lemak, 2007), others fail to find any significant link (Powell, 
1995; Westphal, Gulati and Shortell, 1996) and some even identify an inverse 
relationship (Davis, 1997). In the light of these findings, numerous authors highlight the 
need for a deeper investigation of the relationship between TQM and performance and 
the creation of further bridges between Organizational Theory and TQM (Dean and 
Bowen, 1994; Hackman and Wageman, 1995; Sila, 2007; Sitkin, Sutcliffe and 
Schroeder, 1994; Sousa and Voss, 2002; Spencer, 1994; Waldman, 1994). 
This study explores the link between TQM and performance from different 
perspectives. On the one hand, it contrasts the universal approach to the direct 
relationship between TQM and performance. TQM is almost prescriptive in orientation 
(Dean and Bowen, 1994) and advocates a universal application to organizations and 
organizational activities (Sitkin et al, 1994). On the other hand, the study analyzes the 
cause and effect relationships between TQM and performance, both within and between 
firms. It tests whether the relationship between TQM and performance is associated 
with firms, which were already performing better before the implementation of TQM, or 
whether the relationship is more important for the first firms to put this system into 
practice.    
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The most important contribution of this study is of a methodological nature, 
since it uses panel data, which takes into account the unobservable heterogeneity 
between individuals and the dynamics of firms’ financial variables. Nowadays, any 
business research must take into account not only cross-section effects but also time 
effects. This issue is not present in the existing research on TQM, at least as far as the 
authors are aware. Therefore, the results reported in previous literature are less robust 
than those achieved in the present study are. The main conclusion emerging from this 
study is that only early TQM adopters experience performance gains because of TQM 
implementation. The evidence also suggests that the greatest impact on performance 
takes place a year after receiving external recognition for implementing the system.  
  The remainder of the paper follows the next structure: the second section 
presents the theoretical basis for the study and the hypotheses; the third describes the 
database; the fourth discusses the methodology and results; and the fifth summarizes the 
main conclusions. 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. TQM and Performance – the universal approach 
One of the basic principles when applying a total quality system is to bear in 
mind that TQM practices function as an interdependent system that can be combined 
with other organizational assets to generate competitive advantage (Hackman and 
Wageman, 1995). Milgrom and Roberts (1990) defended the systemic concept and 
develop a formal optimizing model of the way in which manufacturing methods that 
encompass TQM assist firms to maximize their expected profits. Other areas of 
Management Theory, such as Human Resources, apply the concept of fit or internal 
consistency (Arthur, 1994; Huselid, 1995; McDuffie, 1995). In the TQM context, the 
main contributions employing this perspective are those that view TQM as a holistic 
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construct (Chenhall, 1997; Choi and Eboch, 1998; Douglas and Judge, 2001; Easton and 
Jarrel, 1998; Hendricks and Singhal, 1996, 1997, 2001a, b; Lai and Cheng, 2005; York 
and Miree, 2004).   
The use of the systemic concept in TQM complicates implementation because 
the expected outcome depends on the need for a thorough transformation of the firm’s 
management system. Several TQM experts suggest that successful implementation of 
TQM requires metamorphosis, total change or radical change (Reger, Gustafson, 
Demarie and Mullane, 1994) and the complete reformation of organizational culture 
(Olian and Rynes, 1991). The most widely used models at both the theoretical and 
practical levels are the Malcolm Baldrige, the Deming and the European Foundation 
Quality Management (EFQM) models, which incorporate the set of TQM constructs 
most frequently used in the literature (Sousa and Voss, 2002). Given the complexity and 
pervasiveness of implementing TQM in an organization, it is important to assess the 
degree of implementation of TQM practices when evaluating the TQM relationship with 
competitive advantage (Douglas and Judge, 2001). These models also have an 
accreditation system in which a team of experts assesses the internal consistency or fit 
between the various factors.  
The theoretical arguments, which suggest a link between the implementation of 
these systems and firm performance, are diverse. York and Miree (2004) note that the 
arguments gather under two main headings: customer satisfaction (Ahire and Dreyfus 
2000; Choi and Eboch, 1998; Hendricks and Singhal, 1996; Omachonu and Ross, 1994; 
Rust, Zahorik and Keiningham, 1994; Shetty, 1998) and efficiency improvement 
(Anderson et al, 1995; George and Weimerskirch, 1998; Handfield, Ghosh and Fawcet, 
1998; Reed, Lemak and Montgomery 1996). If the firms improve the quality of their 
products and services then their reputation, customer satisfaction and customer loyalty 
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will increase too. As a consequence, firms will be able to increase their market share 
and product prices, and therefore their profits. Firms also achieve efficiency 
improvement by means of productivity increase, improvement of product design and 
processes. The development of these activities will make it possible for the company to 
achieve a reduction in the costs of production and an increase in sales. 
Besides, if the usefulness of TQM from the business perspective lies in its 
potential to achieve and maintain competitive advantage (Powell, 1995) and TQM 
programs increase the degree to which customers consider their requirements met and 
organizations improve efficiency, then global and economic measures of organizational 
effectiveness will improve over the long term (Hackman and Wageman, 1995). 
Hypothesis 1: The implementation of a contrasted TQM system leads to an 
increase in global firm performance.  
2.2. Cause-effect in TQM and Performance 
When investigating the TQM-firm performance relationship, it is necessary to 
bear in mind the causal linkages. Most research that finds a positive relationship 
between TQM and performance establishes causality relationships through cross-section 
data. Some papers (Hendricks and Signal 1997, 1999, 2001a; Easton and Jarrel, 1998) 
attempt to analyze the effect of TQM on performance in the long term. However, few 
studies investigate the causal linkages, that is, whether the increase in performance is a 
direct consequence of TQM or whether there could be a different reason for explaining 
the observed relationship. This study explores the cause-effect links from two different 
points of view to answer two different questions. First, do the best firms adopt a TQM 
system and therefore do performance differentials pre-exist before TQM 
implementation? In other words, are the differentials because some of the firms were 
already better? Second, do early implementers of a contrasted TQM system achieve 
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more performance gains than late-implementer firms do? In other words, does being the 
first have consequences for performance?  
Causation or covariation 
The main argument justifying the first question is that if firms’ performance is 
not analyzed before TQM implementation, it leads to the conclusion that firms have 
improved their performance as a consequence of this innovation, when actually they 
could have been performing better than their counterparts before the implementation. In 
line with this argument York and Miree (2004) consider that if the firms were already 
better performers, it is possible to establish a covariation relationship between TQM and 
performance, but not a causal relationship. One theoretical reason that can justify the 
fact that TQM firms are better is the consideration of TQM as a system. Bearing in 
mind that TQM practices function as an interdependent system, which requires a radical 
and complete change of principles and practices, and that a partial change in practices is 
not effective - as has been defined in the first hypothesis - firms should possess enough 
economic and human resources to be able to effect the transformation. Very few papers 
have analyzed this question. York and Miree (2004) find that firms receiving an award 
already showed a better financial performance than their competitors did before 
adopting TQM methods. Hansson and Eriksson (2002), in their study of Swedish 
quality award recipients, find weak differences in the performance of the firms between 
the implementation period and the post-implementation period. They argue that quality 
award recipients might have been high-performing companies even before 
implementation of TQM.  Hypothesis 2: Firms that adopt a TQM system perform 
better, even before implementation, than those that do not adopt a TQM system. 
Early implementers or late implementers  
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Institutional Theory (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowen 1977) 
tries to account for homogeneity between organizations and it can help to answer our 
second hypothesis. Indeed, a number of authors have used Institutional Theory in the 
analysis of TQM (Mueller and Carter, 2005; Sila, 2007; Staw and Epstein, 2000; 
Westphal and Shortell, 1997; Zeitz, Mittal, and McAulay, 1999). Competitive 
isomorphism describes the tendency of organizations to try to become like those they 
perceive to be more successful, while “mimetic behavior” refers to a widespread 
propensity for managers to adopt practices that are already in place in other 
organizations. A desire to improve performance drives early adopters of organizational 
innovations, but as innovation spreads, it reaches a threshold beyond which adoptions 
provide legitimacy rather than improving performance (Meyer and Rowen, 1977). 
However, strategies that are rational for individual organizations may not be rational if 
large numbers adopt them (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983).  
Under this perspective, Westphal and Shortell (1997), Taylor and Wright (2003) 
and Benner and Veloso (2008) analyze the relationship between early adopters and 
performance, arguing that pioneering companies in applying a TQM model can benefit 
from being the first ones in the market in which they adopt an innovation. Such 
companies can be the first ones to achieve major levels of customer satisfaction or 
efficiency improvements, and therefore take advantage of this better situation. In this 
sense pioneering companies in applying TQM can obtain extraordinary profitability if 
the competition reacts slowly (Lederer, 1995). Otherwise, competitive isomorphism and 
mimetic behaviour can explain why late firms adopt this system although they are not 
the first ones.  
Hypothesis 3a: Firms that are early implementers of a contrasted TQM 
system achieve higher performance gains.  Hypothesis 3b: Late implementers do 
 9
not see the same performance gains as pioneer firms do from adopting a 
contrasted TQM system. 
3. Database 
3.1. TQM implementation 
The choice of the variable to measure the level of TQM adoption is a key issue. 
The literature provides two main options. The first verifies the level of implementation 
by means of surveys or interviews to gather information about the situation within the 
firm. Haynek (2003) cites several measures for the level of TQM implementation used 
in the literature based mainly on surveys. The main drawback associated with this 
approach is the subjectivity of the respondent who tends to be someone involved in the 
organization, and whose replies may therefore lack the rigor required to obtain an 
accurate measure of the variable in question. The other alternative, which the present 
study adopts, is to use the conferral of a quality award as an indicator of a firm's high 
level of TQM implementation. There are several reasons to consider the award as a 
proxy for effective TQM implementation. Two worth mentioning are, first, the criteria 
for conferring the awards measure the level of implementation of this kind of system, 
and, second, the quality awarding involves enquiries at several firm levels, to ensure 
that the winner has effectively succeeded in implementing TQM. For a more detailed 
explanation of the rationale for the use of this proxy, see York and Miree (2004). One 
implication of the use of this proxy is that it avoids the bias of asking the company itself 
to judge the efficiency of its TQM system. Besides, the licensors of prizes exclude 
financial performance in the selection of the winning companies and they ensure that in 
their analysis financial information is independent from TQM practices (Hendricks and 
Singhal, 1997). Nevertheless, the utilization of this proxy has some limitations. For 
example, the number of prizes and criteria can change throughout the years and 
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countries, which makes it impossible to compare strictly results of studies. In addition, 
the use of this variable restricts the results to those winning companies, obviating 
companies that could have implemented suitable TQM but have not competed for a 
quality prize. 
From an empirical viewpoint, some authors have considered the fact of having 
gained a quality prize as a variable proxy to measure the suitable implementation of a 
TQM system and analyze the relationship between implementation and company 
performance. Hendricks and Singhal (1996, 2001b) find that the market price of the 
companies increases on having gained a prize and Adams, McQueen and Seawright 
(1999) obtain similar results only for winners of Malcolm Baldrige awards. More 
related to our study, Hendricks and Singhal (1997, 2001a) and Easton and Jarrell (1998) 
explore the impact of TQM's effective implementation on the operative performance of 
the companies and state that companies that gained quality awards improve their 
performance. York and Miree (2004) question the assertion that winning companies 
improve their performance with the implementation of these systems and argue that 
such companies experience better performance before and after gaining the prize. 
In Europe, the benchmark for firms with a high level of TQM implementation is 
being the recipient of EFQM awards. This study uses a sample of Spanish firms that 
have received TQM prizes awarded at the national or regional level related to EFQM. 
Detailed information about the prizes is available at www.centrosdeexcelencia.com. 
Applicants’ quality reports are evaluated by committees of experts from the awarding 
bodies. The experts have recognized prestige and wide experience in the evaluation of 
TQM. The awarding bodies grant the prizes to companies that have obtained the 
number of points previously set out in the criteria for the evaluation of TQM. The 
criteria are related to leadership, customer focus, process management and employee 
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involvement. This process guarantees that the company receiving the award has a 
suitable level of TQM implementation. 
 For the purposes of this research, the firms selected are those that obtained one 
of these distinctions between 1997 and 2003. The analysis focuses on the period 1994 to 
2006, thus enabling us to observe these firms for a number of years before and after 
receiving an award. 
 In order to prevent problems relating to sampling selection and achieve 
consistent results, the study assembles a sample of control firms with a view to drawing 
comparisons between these and the award-winning firms. The control sample pairs each 
award-winning firm with a group of firms of the same size and sector, and with 
sufficient available financial data. Although some authors use only one control firm, 
from a statistical perspective using all of the firms in the industry reduces the potential 
variability that could arise from choosing single firm.  The grouping by sectors uses the 
four-digit SIC code.  The analysis employs the book value of assets as the variable to 
control for size. When a control group of firms of the same size does not exist, the study 
uses 2-digit SIC code. Under these constraints, for some winners, only there exist nine 
control firms and so, this is the number selected for each winner to maintain the same 
criteria. Therefore, the sample contains 80 award-winning firms and 720 control firms. 
Information on both sets of firms was drawn from the Spanish financial database 
Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos (SABI).  
3.2. Performance 
 The analysis requires a firm performance measure. Some studies analyze the 
effect of TQM in global measures of performance such as share market value and firm 
profit (Narver and Slater, 1990; Nicolau and Sellers, 2009; Sterman, Repenning and 
Kofman, 1997; Rust et al, 1994). Many other papers use financial as well as non-
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financial performance (Powell, 1995; Curkovic, Vickery and Dröge, 2000). 
Chakravarthy (1986), Zhu (2000) or Martínez-Costa, Choi, Martínez and Martínez-
Lorente (2009) among others, indicate that company performance is a complex 
phenomenon requiring more than a single criterion to characterize it. In fact, the 
literature recognizes that performance is a construct that covers diverse intentions and 
levels inside the organization. Following Chakravarthy (1986), this study considers 
several measures of performance that are useful to capture the excellence of a company. 
Specifically, the four routes of performance analyzed are profitability, productivity, the 
ability to raise long-term capital resources and the firm's investment in its future. 
Profitability is a common indicator of performance. The return on assets (ROA), the 
cash flow by investment ratio (CFOI) and the return on sales (ROS) measure this 
dimension. These variables include indicators such as sales or the cost of sales. Garvin 
(1984) and Sousa and Voss (2002) argue that they cover the two main routes for the 
effect of quality on business performance: the manufacturing route and the market 
route.  Productivity is another important way to weigh up the capacity of the company 
and relates to company efficiency. Labor productivity is measured by the added value 
per employee (AVOE) and capital productivity by sales revenue per total assets (SOA). 
Firms’ ability to raise long-term capital resources is measured by the debt to equity ratio 
(DOE).  Bourgeois (1981) also proposes the market-to-book ratio, but the database does 
not include this information. Finally, the firm’s investment in its future is measured by 
the working capital to sales ratio (WOS) as Bourgeois (1981) suggests. Alternative 
variables, such as the percentage of its sales revenues allocated to R&D expenses and 
the increases in the capital expenditure to sales ratio, are not available.  
4. Method and Results  
4.1. TQM and Performance 
 13
 As already indicated in the theoretical framework, the universal hypothesis 
states that contrasted TQM system implementation leads to an increase in firm 
performance. In order to weigh up this issue, that is, the potential changes in the 
performance of firms with total quality systems, we estimate the following general 
model:  
ititittti DSizeePerformancePerformanc εββββ ++++= − 32110, )(    (1) 
where Performancei,t captures the performance measures considered in the study  
of firm i in year t (ROA, CFOI,  ROS, AVOE, SOA, DOE and WOS).  In order to 
include dynamic performance indicators, the model introduces one-period lagged 
performance, where parameter β1 measures the level of performance persistence. The 
value of assets (log) is used as a proxy for firm size. To prevent problems in the 
estimation, this variable is included as an additional explanatory variable only when it is 
not included in the performance measure (ROS, AVOE, DOE and WOS). Finally, the 
model includes a dummy variable that takes different values according to the model 
used. Given the uncertainty as to the exact moment at which the implementation of the 
quality system makes its impact on firm performance, we estimate three different 
models. Thus, model 1 includes CYDit, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for 
award-winning firms the year they receive the TQM award and zero otherwise. Model 2 
includes PYDit, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for award-winning firms the 
year prior to winning the TQM award and zero otherwise. Finally, model 3 includes 
FYDit, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for award-winning firms the year after 
they receive the TQM award and zero otherwise. 
The choice of appropriate methodology to achieve our objectives is vital to the 
robustness of the results. This study employs the panel data methodology, for several 
reasons. Firstly, it is able to incorporate the dynamic features of the variable under 
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analysis. In addition, it controls for individual heterogeneity by introducing the 
unobserved individual effect, ηi, while also incorporating heterogeneity through time, 
µt, in order to control for macroeconomic effects on firm profitability. Therefore, εi,t, 
which is the error term for the firm i observed over t periods has three components: the 
individual effect, ηi, the time effect, µt, and random disturbance, vt. 
The estimation of the dynamic model is carried out using a two-step generalized 
method of moments (GMM, Hansen, 1982) that provides a consistent and efficient 
estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) to address potential endogeneity in the model. The 
instruments are the lags of the dependent variable from t-2 and the lags of the 
independent variables from t-1. Sargan’s statistic tests instrument validity.  Sargan’s 
over-identification test follows a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of over-identifying restrictions. 
In order to eliminate individual effects, and given that ηi may be correlated with 
the remaining variables, we apply first differences of the variables and the model 
obtained is estimated using the error correction procedure proposed by Windmeijer 
(2005) for small samples. The tests m(1) and m(2) - serial correlation tests for order 1 
and 2, respectively - have been calculated using residuals in first differences. The tests 
are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation and the m(2) statistic is calculated following Arellano and Bond (1991). In 
addition, two Wald’s statistics - z1, for the joint significance of the model coefficients, 
and z2, for joint significance of the time dummies - have been estimated.  Both statistics 
are asymptotically distributed as a chi-square under the null hypothesis of no joint 
significance. All estimations were performed using STATA/SE 10. 
------------------- 
Table 1 here 
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------------------- 
Table 1 presents the estimates of all three models used to test hypothesis 1 on the 
full sample and on all performance measures. The table only includes the coefficients 
for the dummy variables representing the moment of the award (the study variable), the 
year of winning the award, the previous year and the later year, m(2) and the Sargan 
test.  For the sake of clarity, the table omits the coefficients of the other variables and 
the other tests.  
A general observation shows that the results can be generalized for all the 
considered measures of performance. It is worth noting that all three models yield the 
same conclusions with respect to the study variables. Whether the results focus on the 
year of the award, the year before, or the year after, the performance of award-winning 
firms does not visibly change. The results suggest that the implementation of a TQM 
system has no significant effect on firm performance. They do not therefore support 
hypothesis one.  This finding stands in contrast to the results of Hendricks and Singhal 
(1997, 2001a) and York and Miree (2004), the studies which best lend themselves to 
comparison with the present study, since they use the conferral of a TQM award as a 
proxy for the effective implementation of a quality system. One possible explanation for 
the divergence of the findings is the methodology used in this study, since the use of 
panel data analysis enables us to take into account certain effects that other methods do 
not consider, although that might affect the results. 
 4.2. Cause-effect analysis  
Hypothesis 2 tests whether firms with high levels of TQM adoption (proxied by a 
quality award) are already performing better than the rest, even before implementing the 
system. Table 2 shows performance averages for both the award-winning and the 
control firms.  
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------------------- 
Table 2 here 
------------------- 
These data span the period from three years prior to winning the award to three 
years afterwards. We found significant differences between the winning firms and the 
control from year one for the ROA, CFOI, ROS and VAOE variables. Additionally, the 
variable ROA shows significant differences at the 10% level for one year and two years 
before receiving the award. Provided that only one of the performance variables shows 
superior values before and after the implementation, it is not possible to state that there 
are significant differences in performance between the winning firms and the control; so 
hypothesis 2 is partially confirmed.   
Hendricks and Singhal (1997) argue that a TQM program takes an average of 
2.5 years to implement and to yield its first benefits. Thus, firms will probably have 
already been developing their TQM system in the years prior to winning a TQM award. 
During that time, the company has to assume some costs to carry out the 
implementation and, consequently, face reduced profits. Furthermore, the return on this 
kind of investment in organizational innovation and human capital will tend to be of a 
long-term nature. These arguments can explain increases in performance differentials 
after the first year.  
Hypotheses 3a and b determine whether the early implementers and late 
implementers increase their performance by adopting a contrasted TQM system. Early-
implementer firms are those that adopt the model before its wide diffusion, while late-
implementer firms are those that take up the model later. These firms, as advanced in 
the theoretical framework, may have different motives for adopting such a system. The 
question is therefore whether pioneer TQM adopters experience significant performance 
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gains and whether late adopters observe this effect too. Equation (1) tests for variation 
in firm performance levels following TQM implementation for the early-adopter firms 
and their late-adopter counterparts. The pioneer sample groups firms that won the award 
in 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000, together with their corresponding control sample, and the 
late-implementer sample groups those that won it in 2001, 2002 and 2003, also with 
their control sample. 
------------------- 
Table 3 here 
------------------- 
Table 3 shows the results for the firms classed as TQM pioneers, based on the 
year they won the award. The coefficients of the dummy variables associated with the 
hypothesis to test vary across the different models and across the different performance 
measures. A common result was obtained for all the measures of performance: whether 
the dummy variable is the year of the award or the year before, the difference in 
performance among the award-winning firms is not significantly different from other 
years. However, if the dummy variable is the year after the award (model 3), the results 
change. Pioneer TQM award winners, that is, the leaders in adopting such systems, 
present significant performance gains, which emerge the year after receiving external 
recognition for their effort. Therefore, the positive impact, rather than being immediate, 
becomes apparent only in the long term.  ROA, CFOI, ROS, VAOE and DOE improve 
significantly the year after the award and SOA and WOS do not change. These results 
show that TQM implementation improves the firm’s performance, though not in all the 
components that can characterize the firm’s excellence. The most visible results centre 
on the measures of profitability, labor productivity and the ability of the firm to raise 
long-term capital resources. These variables are related to the two routes that TQM 
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models use to improve firm performance: customer satisfaction and efficiency. There 
are not significant differences in the dimensions of the firm’s investment in its future 
and capital productivity. The results could be explained because these variables are 
more related to the firm’s innovation ability and the relationship between TQM and 
innovation is not so evident (Perdomo-Ortiz; González Benito and Galende, 2009). 
------------------- 
Table 4 here 
------------------- 
Table 4 shows the results of the second segment, that is, those firms that won a 
quality award in the second part of the sample period. The coefficients on all the 
dummy variables associated with the period when the firm wins the award are not 
significant in all models and performance measures. In some of these models, the Wald 
test rejects the hypothesis of joint significance of the time dummies. The results still 
hold after re-estimating the model without the time dummies (the results are available 
from the authors upon request). Nevertheless, the estimates of the model with the time 
dummies are given here, in order to maintain consistency with those presented 
previously. 
Therefore, our findings confirm that those firms that lead the field in the adoption of 
this management-changing decision actually gain in performance. The performance 
levels of late-implementer firms, by contrast, show no such improvement. This result is 
similar to that obtained by Westphal and Shortell (1997), Taylor and Wright (2003) and 
Benner and Veloso (2008).  
Finally, turning the focus to the group of pioneer firms, where clear performance 
improvements take place following the implementation of their total quality systems, 
this study analyzes whether such performance gains are due to the superior ability of 
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award-winning firms versus non-award winners and, if so, whether their superior ability 
exists before winning the award. In a complementary direction, the study also considers 
what happens with late-adopter firms. In this way, Hypotheses 2 and 3 are combined. 
------------------ 
Table 5 here 
------------------ 
Table 5 shows the differences in means between the pioneer award-winning 
firms and the control firms. The results indicate that the differences become significant 
from year 1 onwards for some of the variables used to measure performance, ROA, 
CFOI, ROS, AVOE and DOE.  In other words, pioneer award-winning firms perform 
better than the rest after obtaining the prize; therefore TQM improves the performance 
of the former and distances them from the latter.  
----------------- 
Table 6 here 
----------------- 
The results relating to the performance of the late-implementer firms are given 
in Table 6 and they show that late TQM adopters do not present better performance 
levels than the control firms and therefore TQM adoption does not necessarily lead to 
performance improvement, in either absolute or relative terms. These results imply that 
later adopters are not necessarily in a better position than their competitors are either 
before winning the prize or afterwards. The tendency of some firms to imitate 
successful companies and to act without evaluating the suitability of the conditions or 
the timing can explain this result. In addition, as suggest Hendricks and Singhal 
(2001b), winning quality awards can also be viewed as a credible a low-cost mechanism 
to signal to the market and customer that the firms have implemented an effective TQM 
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program. This questions, up to a point, the usefulness of the indiscriminate use of these 
improvement systems. 
5. Conclusions 
Following TQM as a global business management system, firms apply a set of 
principles and practices in order to obtain a competitive advantage. Much research has 
been carried out on the impact of the various TQM practices on firm performance. The 
present study, however, uses a systemic approach. For the system to function 
effectively, the firm’s organizational culture must undergo a global change, involving 
the introduction of a set of principles and practices.  This study analyzes the TQM-
performance relationship from the universal approach and examines the cause-effect 
relationship between TQM and performance within and between firms. It addresses the 
question of whether TQM-adopting firms are already more efficient before deciding to 
introduce this organizational innovation into their management framework. It also 
explores two further issues. The first is whether pioneer firms adopt this organizational 
innovation as a means to gain competitive advantage. The second is whether there is an 
isomorphic effect among other firms. This effect could be due to the success and 
relevance of TQM in the business world, or to the wide publicity and advertising given 
to cases where the introduction of the system has resulted in competitive advantage for 
the firm in question.   
Our most important contribution is the use of panel data. This approach allows 
for unobservable individual heterogeneity and controls for possible macroeconomic 
effects on firm performance, which increases the robustness of the results. 
The main conclusions emerging from this study cast doubt on previous research 
findings that claim that the implementation of this type of management system 
invariably leads to performance gains. Our results are consistent with studies that 
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question the universal view of TQM and signal the need to include more factors in the 
analysis. Only pioneer TQM adopters experience performance gains because of 
implementation and present a higher average performance level than the control firms. 
This finding confirms that a desire to improve performance often drives early adopters 
of organizational innovations. The evidence also suggests that the greatest impact on 
performance takes place a year after receiving external recognition for implementing the 
system. This implies a long-term effect, taking into account that the firms fully develop 
the system after an interval of at least two years before receiving the award.  
The firms defined as late implementers, however, experience no performance 
gains and their average performance level is no higher than that of their control sample. 
Therefore, as the adoption of these systems becomes more widespread, TQM adopters 
fail to adapt the system to their own idiosyncrasy and organizational inertia motivates 
its adoption. In such cases, it appears that TQM adoption simply helps them to maintain 
their attained level of performance but not to improve their results. 
Our findings indicate that, prior to full implementation of the system, TQM 
adopters overall show a higher performance level than the control sample on only one of 
the variables that measure performance, that is, ROA. Therefore, in general, the results 
do not support the assertion that companies were better before TQM adoption. 
These findings may help firms to decide to what extent this kind of firm 
management improvement is worth adopting and to calculate the associated costs, in the 
awareness that the results are neither immediate nor equal across early and late adopters. 
The latter should rethink before carrying out investments that incur an extra cost if they 
do not achieve an increase in financial performance. The aura created around these 
systems does not seem to have real effects in the late-winning companies. Nevertheless, 
many companies develop these systems in the expectation of some other benefits, such 
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as supporting the image of the company and improvement in employee satisfaction 
(Yang, 2006). 
Finally, this study provides public and private institutions with some useful 
guidelines for the planning of future actions to promote the adoption of these 
management systems. As far as possible, public institutions should control the 
utilization of public funds, promoting only activities that are innovative, and analyzing 
whether some implementations are only fads of the moment, without real repercussions. 
In addition, managers should consider whether it is worth involving the company in the 
whole process of competing for a quality prize with the aim of increasing its 
performance and devise alternative methods to implement improvements through 
quality or other innovations. 
 23
References 
Adams G., McQueen G. and Seawright K. Revisiting the stock price impact of quality 
awards. Omega 1999; 27: 595-604. 
Ahire S, Dreyfus P. The impact of design management and process management on 
quality. Journal of Operations Management 2000; 18 (5): 549-575. 
Anderson JC, Rungtusanatham M, Schroeder RG. A path analytic model of a theory of 
quality management underlying the Deming management method: preliminary 
empirical findings. Decision Sciences 1995; 26 (5): 637-658. 
Arellano M, Bond S. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence 
and an application to employment equations. Review of Economics Studies 
1991; 58: 277-297. 
Arthur JB. Effects of human resource system on manufacturing performance and 
turnover. Academy of Management Journal 1994; 37: 670-687. 
Benner MJ, Veloso FM. ISO 9000 practices and financial performance: A technology 
coherence perspective. Journal of Operations 2008; 26 (5): 611-629. 
 Bourgeois III LJ. On the measurement of organizational slack. Academy of 
Management Review 1981; 6:29-40. 
Chakravarthy BS. Measuring strategic performance. Strategic Management Journal 
1986; 7: 437-458. 
Chenhall RH. Reliance on manufacturing performance, total quality management and 
organizational performance. Management Accounting Research 1997; 8: 187-
206. 
Choi  T, Eboch K. The TQM paradox: relations among TQM practices, plant 
performance, and customer satisfaction. Journal of Operations Management 
1998; 17: 59-75. 
 24
Curkovic S, Vickery S, Dröge C. Quality-related action programs: their impact on 
quality performance and firm performance. Decision Science 2000; 31(4): 885-
905. 
David RJ, Strang D. When fashion is fleeting: transitory collective beliefs and the 
dynamics of TQM consulting. Academy of Management Journal 2006; 49 (2): 
215-233.  
Davis T. Breakdowns in total quality management, International Journal of 
Management, 1997; 14(1): 13-23. 
Dean JW, Bowen DE. Management theory and total quality: improving research and 
practice through theory development. Academy of Management Review, 1994; 
19 (3): 392-418. 
Di Maggio PJ, Powell TC. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 
1983; 48: 147-160. 
Douglas TJ, Judge Jr.WQ. Total quality management implementation and competitive 
advantange: the rol of structural control and exploration. Academy of 
Management Journal 2001; 44: 158-169.  
Easton GS, Jarrell SL. The effects of Total Quality Management on corporate 
performance: an empirical investigation. Journal of Business 1998; 71(2): 253-
307. 
Garvin DA. How the Baldrige Awards really works. Harvard Business Review 1991; 
69(6): 80-93. 
George S, Weimerskirch A. Total quality management: strategies and techniques proven 
at today´s most successful companies. Wiley, New York, NY, 1998. 
 25
Hackman J, Wageman R. Total Quality Management: empirical, conceptual, and 
practical issues. Administrative Science Quaterly 1995; 40: 309-342. 
Handfield R, Ghosh S, Fawcett S. Quality-driven change and its effects on financial 
performance. Quality Management Journal 1998; 5(3): 13-30. 
Hansen LP. Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators.  
Econometrica 1982; 50: 1029-1959. 
Hansson J. Eriksson H. The impact of TQM on financial performance. Measuring 
Business Excellence 2002; 6(4): 44-54. 
Haynak H. The relationship between total quality management practices and their 
effects on firm performance. Journal of Operations Management 2003;21: 405-
435. 
Hendricks KB, Singhal VR. Quality awards and the market value of the firm: an 
empirical investigation. Management Science 1996; 42(3): 415-436. 
Hendricks KB, Singhal VR. Does implementing an effective TQM program actually 
improve operating performance? Empirical evidence from firms that have won 
quality awards.  Management Science 1997; 43(9): 1258-1274. 
Hendricks KB, Singhal VR. Don´t count TQM out. Quality Progress 1999; 32(4): 35-
42. 
Hendricks KB, Singhal VR. Firm characteristics, total quality management and 
financial performance. Journal of Operations Management 2001a; 19(3): 269-
285. 
Hendricks KB, Singhal VR. The long-run stock price performance of firms with 
effective TQM programs. Management Science 2001b; 47(3)): 359-368. 
 26
Huselid MA. The impact of human resource management practices on turnover, 
productivity, and corporate financial performance. Academy of Management 
Journal 1995; 38(3): 635-672. 
Lai, K., Cheng, T.C.E. Effects of quality management and marketing on organizational 
performance. Journal of Business Research 2005; 58: 446-456. 
Lederer PJ., Rhee SK. Economics of total quality management. Journal of Operations 
Management 1995; 12: 353-367. 
MacDuffie JP. Human resource bundles and manufacturing performance: 
Organizational logic and flexible production system in the world auto industry. 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 1995; 48(2):197-221. 
Martínez-Costa M, Choi TY, Martínez JA, Martínez Lorente AR. ISO 9000/1994, ISO 
9001/2000 and TQM: The performance debate revisited. Journal of Operations 
Management 2009; 27: 495-511.  
Meyer JW, Rowen B. Institutional organizations: Formal structure as myth and 
ceremony. American Journal of Sociology 1977; 83: 340-363.  
Milgrom P, Roberts J. The economics of modern manufacturing: Technology.  
American Economic Review 1990; 80(3): 511-528. 
Miller D. Hartwick J. Le Breton-Miller I. How to detect a management fad-and 
distinguish it froma a classic. Business Horizons 2004; 47(4): 7-16. 
Mueller F, Carter C. The Scripting of Total Quality Management within its 
Organizational Biography. Organization Studies 2005; 26(2): 221-247.  
Narver JC, Slater SF. The effect of a market orientation on business profitability. 
Journal of Marketing 1990; 54(4): 20-35. 
Nicolau JL, Sellers R. The quality of quality awards: Disminishing information 
asymmetries in a hotel chain. Journal of Business Research 2009; in press 
 27
Olian JD, Rynes SL. Making Total Quality Work: Aligning Organizational Processes, 
Performance Measures, and Stakeholders. Human Resource Management 1991; 
30(3): 303-333. 
Omachonu VK, Ross JE.  Principles of Total Quality. St. Lucie Press, Delray Beach, 
FL. 1994. 
Perdomo-Ortiz J, González-Benito J, Galende J: The intervening effect of business 
innovation capability on the relationship between Total Quality Management 
and technological innovation. International Journal of Production Research 
2009; 47 (15): 5087-5107. 
Powell TC. Total quality management as competitive advantage: a review and empirical 
study. Strategic Management Journal 1995; 16(1): 15-37. 
Reed R, Lemak DJ, Montgomery JC. Beyond process: TQM content and firm 
performance. Academy of Management Review 1996; 21(1): 173-202. 
Reger RK, Gustafson LT, Demarie SM,  Mullane JV. Reframing the organization: Why 
implementing total quality easier said than done. Academy of Management 
Review 1994; 19(3): 565-584. 
Rich E. Management fads and information delays: An exploratory simulation study. 
Journal of Business Research 2008; 61: 1143-1151. 
Rust RT, Zahorik AJ, Keiningham TL. Return on quality: measuring the financial 
impact of your company´s quest for quality. Probus Publishing Company, 
Chicago, IL. 1994. 
Shenaway EE, Baker T, Lemak DJ. A meta-analysis of the effect of TQM on 
competitive advantage. International Journal of Quality & Reliability 
Management, 2007; 25(5): 442-471. 
 28
Shetty YK. Managing product quality for profitability SAM. Advanced Management 
Journal 1998; 53(4): 33-38.  
Sila I. Examining the effects of contextual factors on TQM and performance through the 
lens of organizational theories: An empirical study. Journal of Operations 
Management 2007; 25: 83-109. 
Sitkin SB, Sutcliffe KM, Schroeder RG. Distinguishing control from learning in total 
quality management: a contingency perspective. Academy of Management 
Review 1994; 19(3): 537-567. 
Sousa R, Voss C. Quality Management revisited: a reflective review and agenda for 
future research. Journal of Operations Management 2002; 20: 91-109. 
Spencer B. Models of rganisation and total quality management: a comparison and 
critical evaluation. Academy of Management Review 1994; 19(3): 446-471. 
Staw BM, Epstein LD. What Bandwagons Bring: Effects of Popular Management 
Techniques on Corporate Performance, Reputation, and CEO Pay. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 2004; 5(3): 523-556. 
Sterman JD, Repenning NP, Kofman F. Unanticipated side effects of successful quality 
programs: exploring a paradox of organizational improvement. Management 
Science 1997; 43(4): 503-521. 
Taylor WA, Wright GH. A longitudinal study of TQM implementation: factor 
influencing success and failure. Omega 2003; 31: 97-111. 
Waldman DA. The contributions of total quality management to a theory of work 
performance. Academy of Management Review 1994;19(3): 510-536. 
Westphal JD, Gulati R,  Shortell SM. The institutionalization of Total Quality 
Management: the emergence of normative TQM adoption and the consequences 
 29
for organizational legitimacy and performance.  Academy of Management 
Proceedings 1996: 249-253. 
Westphal JD, Shortell SM. Customization or Conformity? An Institutional and Network 
Perspective on the Content and Consequences of TQM adoption. Administrative 
Science Quarterly 1997; 42: 366-394.   
Windmeijer F. A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step 
GMM estimators. Journal of Econometrics 2005; 126: 25-51. 
York KM, Miree CE. Causation or covariation: an empirical re-examination of the link 
between TQM and financial performance. Journal of Operations Management 
2004; 22: 291-311. 
Yang C-C, The impact of human resource management practices on the implementation 
of total quality management: an empirical study on high tech firms. The TQM 
Magazine 2006; 18(2): 162-173. 
Zeitz G, Mittal V, McAulay B. Distinguishing Adoption and Entrenchment of 
Management Practices: A Framework for Analysis. Organization Studies 1999; 
20(5): 741-776. 
Zhu J. Multi-factor performance measure model with an application to Fortune 500 
companies. European Journal of Operational Research
 30
Table 1. GMM estimation results. Whole sample.  
 ROA  CFOI 
*10-2 
ROS 
*10-2 
AVOE 
*10-3 
SOA 
*10-2 
DOE WOS 
*10-3 
Model 1        
βCYD -0.01 -0.50 -0.63 -0.22 -0.58 0.54 -0.21 
(p-value) (0.99) (0.32) (0.29) (0.31) (0.11) (0.51) (0.61) 
m2 -0.43 1.49 1.31 1.34 1.60 -1.18 -1.31 
(p-value) (0.66) (0.13) (0.19) (0.18) (0.12) (0.23) (0.19) 
Sargan(df) 23.38 
(26) 
29.43 
(24) 
32.28 
(25) 
46.72 
(37) 
23.41 
(26) 
33.56 
(37) 
18.87 
(27) 
(p-value) (0.62) (0.20) (0.15) (0.13) (0.61) (0.63) (0.87) 
        
Model 2        
βPYD 0.38 0.57 0.44 0.16 0.29 -0.74 0.04 
(p-value) (0.30) (0.33) (0.38) (0.47) (0.36) (0.59) (0.87) 
m2 -0.43 1.48 1.31 1.34 1.59 -1.18 -1.31 
(p-value) (0.66) (0.14) (0.19) (0.18) (0.12) (0.23) (0.19) 
Sargan(df) 24.44 
(26) 
29.38 
(24) 
32.21 
(25) 
47.18 
(37) 
23.57 
(26) 
34.07 
(37) 
18.71 
(27) 
(p-value) (0.55) (0.21) (0.15) (0.12) (0.60) (0.60) (0.88) 
        
Model 3        
βFYD -0.02 0.29 0.32 0.02 0.28 -0.63 0.41 
(p-value) (0.96) (0.57) (0.48) (0.91) (0.29) (0.41) (0.52) 
m2 -0.43 1.48 1.32 1.34 1.60 -1.18 -1.31 
(p-value) (0.66) (0.14) (0.19) (0.18) (0.12) (0.23) (0.19) 
Sargan(df) 23.67 
(26) 
29.51 
(24) 
32.32 
(25) 
47.00 
(37) 
24.02 
(26) 
33.40 
(37) 
18.73 
(27) 
(p-value) (0.59) (0.20) (0.15) (0.13) (0.57) (0.63) (0.88) 
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Table 2. Mean percent in performance. Whole sample. Differences between the 
performance of the winners and their respective controls. 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at  5% 
*** significant at 1% 
 
        Years       
Mean   -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
ROA Winners 4.65 6.00 6.52 5.86 5.87 5.33 4.94 
  
Controls 4.53 4.34 5.15 5.12 3.95 3.33 3.35 
  
t-value 0.14 1.88* 1.8* 1.19 2.82*** 2.46** 1.83* 
CFOI Winners 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 
  
Controls 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 
  
t-value 0.15 0.70 0.52 0.29 2.01** 1.97** 2.01** 
ROS Winners 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.16 0.09 0.07 
  
Controls 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 
  
t-value 0.75 1.30 0.63 0.06 1.97* 1.56 1.35 
AVOE Winners 65349 68030 60667 53559 60683 62779 61751 
  
Controls 50200 58147 56455 44786 47979 46583 45963 
  
t-value 1.60 1.10 0.53 -0.37 1.95** 1.98** 1.89** 
SOA Winners 1.51 1.32 1.22 1.34 1.35 1.33 1.20 
  
Controls 1.49 1.18 1.21 1.32 1.40 1.41 1.19 
  
t-value 0.14 1.03 0.14 0.30 -0.43 -0.82 0.09 
DOE Winners 64.41 61.99 60.75 59.75 58.32 57.72 55.21 
  
Controls 64.70 63.58 62.94 61.98 61.90 60.99 60.50 
  
t-value -0.13 -0.68 -0.94 -1.01 -1.52 -1.27 -1.57 
WOS*102 Winners 0.20 0.04 0.91 0.05 0.58 0.08 0.03 
  
Controls 0.05 0.15 1,03 0.06 0.20 0.03 0.03 
  
t-value 1.03 -0.81 -0.16 -0.73 0.72 1.12 0.29 
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Table 3. GMM estimation results. Early adopter firms  
 
 ROA  CFOI 
*10-1 
ROS 
*10-2 
AVOE 
*10-3 
SOA 
*10-2 
DOE WOS 
*10-3 
Model 1        
βCYD 0.26 -0.04 -0.09 -0.12 -0.17 -0.91 0.01 
(p-value) (0.65) (0.51) (0.20) (0.47) (0.58) (0.70) (0.21) 
m2 1.20 1.06 1.24 0.04 0.99 -0.96 -0.25 
(p-value) (0.22) (0.28) (0.21) (0.96) (0.32) (0.34) (0.80) 
Sargan(df) 27.05 
(20) 
22.78 
(18) 
27.06 
(20) 
20.70 
(19) 
21.58 
(20) 
11.60 
(19) 
12.14 
(14) 
(p-value) (0.13) (0.20) (0.13) (0.35) (0.36) (0.90) (0.58) 
        
Model 2        
βPYD 0.94 -1.24 -0.02 0.18 -0.19 -2.11 -0.01 
(p-value) (0.20) (0.32) (0.75) (0.17) (0.64) (0.50) (0.48) 
m2 1.20 1.00 1.24 0.03 1.00 -0.96 -1.06 
(p-value) (0.23) (0.37) (0.21) (0.97) (0.32) (0.34) (0.28) 
Sargan(df) 27.43 
(20) 
21.52 
(17) 
27.44 
(20) 
20.91 
(19) 
22.12 
(20) 
11.73 
(19) 
21.64 
(19) 
(p-value) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12) (0.34) (0.33) (0.90) (0.30) 
        
Model 3        
βFYD 0.97 0.12 0.10 0.20 0.27 -1.79 -0.02 
(p-value) (0.06) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) (0.41) (0.08) (0.18) 
m2 1.29 1.11 1.24 0.04 0.99 -0.93 -0.24 
(p-value) (0.20) (0.26) (0.21) (0.96) (0.32) (0.35) (0.81) 
Sargan(df) 27.10 
(20) 
23.05 
(18) 
27.25 
(20) 
21.23 
(19) 
21.77 
(20) 
24.81 
(20) 
21.76 
(20) 
(p-value) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13) (0.32) (0.35) (0.21) (0.35) 
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Table 4. GMM estimation results. Late adopter firms.  
 ROA  CFOI  
*10-2 
ROS 
*10-2 
AVOE 
*10-3 
SOA 
*10-2 
DOE WOS 
*10-3 
Model 1        
βCYD 0.36 0.01 0.02 -0.12 -0.76 -0.20 -0.57 
(p-value) (0.73) (0.96) (0.63) (0.47) (0.15) (0.83) (0.49) 
m2 -1.31 -1.34 0.71 0.04 1.23 -1.23 -1.08 
(p-value) (0.19) (0.18) (0.48) (0.96) (0.22) (0.22) (0.28) 
Sargan(df) 19.59 
(14) 
 12.52 
(14) 
 12.13 
(14) 
20.70 
(19) 
8.63  
(14) 
19.76 
(14) 
20.13 
(21) 
(p-value) (0.15) (0.56) (0.59) (0.35) (0.85) (0.14) (0.51) 
        
Model 2        
βPYD 0.65 0.09 -0.02 0.18 0.35 0.04 0.63 
(p-value) (0.36) (0.19) (0.63) (0.17) (0.51) (0.95) (0.42) 
m2 -1.30 -1.34 0.71 0.03 1.21 -1.23 -1.08 
(p-value) (0.19) (0.18) (0.48) (0.97) (0.22) (0.22) (0.28) 
Sargan(df)  19.35 
(14) 
12.95 
(14) 
12.16 
(14) 
20.91 
(19) 
8.62 
 (14) 
19.79 
(14) 
20.67 
(21) 
(p-value) (0.16) (0.55) (0.59) (0.34) (0.85) (0.14) (0.48) 
        
Model 3        
βFYD -0.84 -0.09 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.13 0.00 
(p-value) (0.39) (0.36) (0.95) (0.11) (0.99) (0.87) (0.98) 
m2 -1.31 -1.34 0.71 0.04 1.22 -1.22 -1.08 
(p-value) (0.19) (0.18) (0.47) (0.96) (0.22) (0.22) (0.28) 
Sargan(df) 19.46 
(14) 
12.55 
(14) 
 12.93 
(14) 
21.23 
(19) 
8.51  
(14) 
19.65 
(14) 
20.64 
(21) 
(p-value) (0.15) (0.56) (0.60) (0.32) (0.86) (0.14) (0.48) 
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Table 5. Mean percent in performance. Differences between the performance of the early 
winners and their respective controls. 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at  5% 
*** significant at 1% 
 
        Years       
Mean   -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
ROA Winners 4.14 5.92 6.67 6.32 6.66 5.83 5.15 
  
Controls 4.51 4.68 5.40 5.74 4.38 4.02 2.85 
  
t-value -0.32 1.14 1.31 0.80 2.77*** 2.15** 2.32** 
CFOI Winners 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.12 
  
Controls 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 
  
t-value 1.11 0.15 0.29 0.00 1.97** 1.85* 2.16** 
ROS Winners 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.07 
  
Controls 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 
  
t-value -0.21 1.04 0.91 0.58 2.01** 2.23** 2.34** 
AVOE Winners 57978 83025 67522 47093 69028 66485 68586 
  
Controls 51206 65263 58774 46947 45626 43254 41650 
  
t-value 0.90 1.31 0.80 0.03 1.97** 1.82* 1.93* 
SOA Winners 1.37 1.33 1.21 1.25 1.31 1.29 1.11 
  
Controls 1.40 1.20 1.20 1.24 1.33 1.35 1.12 
  
t-value -0.15 0.72 0.07 0.05 -0.16 -0.49 -0.04 
DOE Winners 62.97 59.57 58.18 57.95 56.06 56.15 55.87 
  
Controls 65.25 62.48 61.40 60.86 61.66 61.37 60.46 
  
t-value -0.75 -0.93 -1.11 -1.10 -2.02** -1.89* -1.82* 
WOS*102 Winners 0.04 0.05 0.70 0.05 0.93 0.10 0.03 
  
Controls 0.03 0.05 0.68 0.08 0.31 0.02 0.03 
  
t-value 0.73 -0.12 0.03 -0.77 0.72 1.17 -0.02 
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Table 6. Mean percent in performance. Differences between the performance of the late 
winners and their respective controls.   
* significant at 10% 
** significant at  5% 
*** significant at 1% 
 
        Years       
Mean   -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
ROA Winners 5.63 6.15 6.24 4.95 4.37 4.32 4.26 
  
Controls 4.55 3.69 4.65 3.90 3.09 1.97 4.82 
  
t-value 0.78 1.61 1.27 0.92 1.08 1.35 -0.31 
CFOI Winners 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.09 
  
Controls 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.09 
  
t-value -0.32 -1.47 -1.04 -0.54 1.24 -1.11 0.29 
ROS Winners 0.24 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.31 0.01 0.07 
  
Controls 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
  
t-value 0.85 0.75 -0.05 -1.69 1.19 -1.45 1.01 
AVOE Winners 76071 44289 49527 38005 63359 52871 51010 
  
Controls 48636 46583 52846 41425 51378 51820 52671 
  
t-value 1.32 -0.39 -0.32 -0.73 1.03 0.11 -0.19 
SOA Winners 1.71 1.30 1.24 1.49 1.42 1.39 1.34 
  
Controls 1.63 1.16 1.22 1.44 1.52 1.51 1.31 
  
t-value 0.21 0.76 0.14 0.39 -0.43 -0.69 0.16 
DOE Winners 66.50 65.55 64.61 62.63 61.78 61.41 52.66 
  
Controls 63.84 65.28 65.34 63.71 62.26 60.31 64.27 
  
t-value 0.76 0.08 -0.19 -0.29 -0.12 0.20 -1.78 
WOS*102 Winners 0.46 0.03 1.23 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 
  
Controls 0.08 0.31 1.56 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
  
t-value 0.99 -0.79 -0.28 0.27 -0.60 -0.40 0.53 
 
 
 
